MATTHEW KOHRMAN

MOTORCYCLES FOR THE DISABLED: MOBILITY, MODERNITY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF EXPERIENCE IN URBAN CHINA

ABSTRACT. This paper describes changes in people's attitudes toward and experiences of disability in contemporary China. In particular, it examines how, as a result of shifting gender structures and modernist modes of production, urban men who struggle to walk have adopted cycle technologies, and how this has caused Chinese society increasingly to associate these men with disability. The paper further details ways the young state-run advocacy organization, the China Disabled Persons' Federation, has contributed to these attitudinal and experiential shifts by providing more assistance to urban men who struggle to walk than to any other PRC citizens who might be considered disabled. In general, the transformations outlined in this paper exemplify how ongoing macro changes in contemporary China often provide benefits to a relatively small number of people and how, for those who receive them, the benefits are often double-edged.

INTRODUCTION

In September 1994, I flew from Boston to Beijing, a city where I studied for two years in the mid 1980s but subsequently barely visited. My goal that September was to interview people and officials at the Far East and South Pacific Games for the Disabled (FESPIC) and begin my second year of dissertation research in Beijing on the social construction of disability in contemporary China.¹

In spite of its size and pageantry, the first few days of FESPIC were ethnographic disappointments. So, by the fourth day, I was thinking of leaving the games behind and starting in earnest my second year of community research. But that afternoon, just as I was exiting a ping-pong stadium and beginning to trek across a pavilion towards another of the Asian Games Village's towering athletic facilities, something happened that fundamentally altered my fieldwork.

It started with a rumbling din. Then, before I knew it, I was enveloped by the deafening sound of small engines as a convoy of thirty motorcycles zoomed around the ping-pong stadium and shot across the pavilion, the riders whooping and waving as they raced by. In the twenty seconds or so

it took them to pass, I realized these people were like no "bikers" I had ever seen before. Rather than black leather, these motorcyclists wore polyester pants, bright white t-shirts and yellow trimmed baseball caps. And instead of Harley-Davidsons, each rode a very unusual vehicle – possessing three wheels (one in front and two in back), a seat shaped like a straight-back chair, and a chase and fenders painted vermilion. Adding to the confusion and oddity of the sight was the fact that, next to most of the drivers, were precariously lashed a set of crutches.

"Who are all these people?" I wondered to myself. "And why are they all driving these motorbikes?"

When I reached the other side of the pavilion, most of the riders had already dismounted and were starting to make their way into the stadium with cane or crutch. I introduced myself to a few of them and learned that these sports fans, mostly men, were all from Beijing and had been organized months earlier into a cheering squad (la la dua) by The China Disabled Persons' Federation, the powerful state organ run by Deng Pufang, Deng Xiaoping's paraplegic son. When I told these cheering squad members I was fascinated by their motorbikes and noted they must possess the only vehicles of this kind in Beijing, my interlocutor's faces shifted from smiles, to blank looks, to unbridled laughter. "The only ones in Beijing? You haven't been here very long, have you," one man said between the group's collective guffaws. "Look around. These bikes are everywhere. There are thousands of them in this city."

The next day, rather than attend more FESPIC events, I decided to follow this man's advice. I borrowed a friend's bicycle and spent the day pedaling through central Beijing, visiting many of the neighborhoods that I had developed fond feelings for in the mid 1980s. On my ride, I counted more than fifty of the three-wheeled vermilion motorbikes, some parked in front of stores amidst a jumble of bicycles, some cruising Beijing's wide boulevards. Nearly all the drivers I saw were men, more than a few of whom traveled with a pair of crutches. Many of their bikes bore symbolic markings of disablement: license plates or decals with the international icon of disability (a stick drawing of a person on a wheelchair).

Thus, there in Beijing was something I never expected, and it contrasted vividly with the picture of disability I had painted in my mind based on my first year of fieldwork, conducted in rural Hainan province (located east of Vietnam). During that earlier research (1993–1994), I never saw anybody using a wheelchair, motorized or otherwise. Nearly all my native Hainanese acquaintances who might benefit from such conveyances either got along by using homemade crutches or by hobbling or, in some cases, by crawling. Just as significant was the fact that very few of my Hainanese
informants ever articulated any sense of connection with a domestic – let alone an international – disability movement. Moreover, most people in the village where I conducted research were unaware of either Deng Pufang or his Federation.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the role these motorcycles have played in shaping people’s understandings and social experiences of disability in Beijing, and, by extension, other metropolitan areas of the P.R.C. In doing so, this paper seeks to provide concrete illustrations of important transformations underway in contemporary China.

The discussion to come is framed around the following three questions: What historical forces have fueled the development of motorcycle technologies for the disabled? How have these technologies contributed to the production of new understandings and responses to disability among Chinese people? And, how have users’ lives been affected by the technology?

FORDISM AND THE RISE OF THREE-WHEELER TECHNOLOGY

To understand how three-wheeled motorcycles have been implicated in framing “disability” in contemporary urban China, one must begin by highlighting larger processes that have lead to these vehicles’ introduction and proliferation. The emphasis in this first section, consequently, will often center more on the “social life of things” (Appadurai 1986) than on the people who use the “things.”

In modern China, as in many societies, the development of wheeled devices has been linked to issues of power and modernity. Several North American and Europe scholars have demonstrated that in their countries, the proliferation of mass-produced wheeled mechanisms has been tied to a regime of accumulation which they have called Fordism (e.g., Gramsci 1971, Harvey 1990, Martin 1992). Named for the American industrialist, Fordism has several features. One of the most important is time-space compression, the idea that power – both institutional and monetary – can be expanded by harnessing technology to speed-up human actions so that the temporal and geographic distances of productive tasks are reduced. Time-space compression, scholars of Fordist state, involves a dramatic transition in not only the way people approach labor but also how they experience the self and the body (changes that are held to be emblematic of our increasingly globalized postmodern times).2

Fully detailing Fordism’s rise outside of China is obviously not possible in this paper. Nor is it possible for me here to scrutinize all the transnational
and domestic processes that have shaped Fordism and post-Fordism in the People’s Republic (see Ong and Nonini 1997). However, I would argue, to understand the growth of mobility aids for “disabled people” in China, it is necessary that we give careful attention to how Chinese society has incorporated time-space compression into national, institutional and individual agendas, as well as examine how this incorporation has affected both the definition and experience of disability.

Chinese people have for centuries considered speed of great value. But it was not until the 20th century and the rise of Chinese nationalism that using speed to compress time and space became a paramount agenda of the state. Mao’s Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) notwithstanding, a perennial goal of the Communist Party (CCP) has been speeding-up human activity so to catapult China and the Chinese people to the forefront of world modernity. After 1949, one of the first ways the CCP symbolically and pragmatically pursued the modern was by building urban roadways. By crisscrossing cities with clean wide surfaced roads, the Chinese leadership was at once facilitating faster urban movement and symbolically pronouncing to the nation and the world that “New China” was quickly advancing. Until recently, though, it was just the dictatorship of the proletariat – the CCP’s largely male leaders – who were permitted to use motorized sedans on either the newly built urban boulevards or China’s thousands of kilometers of unpaved roads. For most urbanites during the first few decades of the People’s Republic, the only motorized devices available to them were over-crowded busses.

One type of non-motorized transportation that was increasingly visible on city roads after 1949, and which was carefully rationed to “urban workers” through a coupon system, was the bicycle. Bicycle rationing gradually enabled more and more city workers to move across urban landscapes at speeds that were, collectively, far faster than anything ever achieved before in China. Not surprisingly, owing to its speed, its scarcity and the banning of rickshaws after 1949, the standard black bicycle was a coveted status symbol during the early years of the People’s Republic, a status symbol that was enjoyed mainly by an elite and, again, predominantly male sector of society. The cachet associated with possessing and riding a bicycle, particularly one with a good brand name, remained strong until the early 1980s when production finally caught up with demand and bicycles became a ubiquitous part of urban residency for both men and women (Gaubatz 1995: 43).

Bicycles’ initial status and their eventual ubiquity among city dwellers contributed significantly to the notion of the urban resident (shi min) during the Maoist and early post-Maoist epochs. To be a rightful and respect-
able urbanite, one was expected to operate a bicycle. Indeed, pedaling a
bicycle became an enunciation (De Certeau 1984) of the modern person:
an individuated being possessing the ability (neng lì) to use technology to
speed-up society. Likewise, bicycle usage became an embodied statement
about personal privilege and the right to belong in the highly desired and
tightly restricted metropolitan setting.

THE HAND-CRANK TRICYCLE

Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, in particular, greatly expanded bicycle usage.
Profit-seeking manufacturers, in the early 1980s, increased the production
and varieties of bicycles, including female bicycles, child bicycles and,
eventually, mountain bikes. In addition to these, there was at least one more
type of cycle that began to appear in large cities during the early 1980s, one
which served a highly specialized domestic market. This was the “hand-
crank tricycle” (shou yao san lun che) – the first widely used “disability”
conveyance in China.4 Initially, most hand-crank tricycles were built at
home by men out of old bicycle parts and were only later produced in
small numbers by factories.

Who used hand-crank bikes and what attracted them to the technology?

Anecdotal observations, formal interviews and discussions with local
residents indicate that the vast majority of people in Beijing who have used
hand-crank tricycles over the years have been men whose lower bodies
cannot provide the balance and propulsion needed to operate a bicycle.
Many of these men, although not all, have been polio survivors. Polio was
a major scourge in the PRC during the 1950s and 1960, striking people of
all class backgrounds. Today, the lion’s share of people who live with the
paralytic effects of polio are adults between the age of 30 and 45. These
men and women can be found in nearly every community in the nation.

In China, polio survivors and others with weak or damaged legs are
frequently called que zi. A close English-language equivalent to que zi
is “the lame.” But such an English gloss is incomplete because it under-
emphasizes two crucial characteristics of the term. First, while in earlier
historical epochs que zi was used to signify those with either a “sick hand
or foot” (shou jiao bing), since the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) it almost
exclusively has designated those who have trouble “moving” (dong) (Lu
& Dao 1996: 10–12). Second, que zi is an intensely pejorative idiom.

The disapproval encoded in the term que zi reflects that today
and in the past Chinese people with certain bodily differences have
persistently undergone what Kleinman et al. call “intersubjective delegit-
imation” (1995: 1328). Through complex processes, Chinese citizens have
relentlessly objectified polio survivors and others with supposed corporal defects, transmuting their so-called spoiled bodies (shen ti) into flawed social and moral status (shen fen). As a consequence, polio survivors and others viewed as que have for centuries been denied educational opportunities, discriminated against in jokes, shunned as potential marriage partners, and treated with paternalism or bureaucratic indifference. Such delegitimation and discrimination has occurred in part because of the importance Chinese culture has long placed on bodily perfection as an indicator of moral and spiritual standing (Hansson 1988). But, to be sure, Chinese people have also considered the lives of “que zi” spoiled because the “que” are understood to be lacking in the ability (neng li) to traverse space.

In recent years it would seem that the evolving regime of Fordism has played a significant role not only in this second type of delegitimation but also in the transformation of the “que zi” category from denoting someone with a “sick hand or foot” to denoting “the immobile.” In particular, the proliferation of bicycle usage has greatly amplified the perception that the “que” have difficulty moving. As noted above, bicycle usage in China after 1949 became an enunciation of social rank, personhood and belonging. But because bicycles were engineered to be powered by legs of a specific sort, they were of little use to most polio survivors and others like them who were unable to produce the necessary syncopated leg movement. Rather, these sorts of people often found bicycles to accentuate their moral, political and economic decline. As a Beijing polio survivor named Meng once told me, “The sudden growth of bicycles in China didn’t help us a bit. They just made people like me slower, more incompetent (geng bu neng gan) and more que.”

Curiously, the delegitimation bicycle proliferation visited on people such as Meng contributed significantly to them, ultimately, adopting cycle technology. “To keep up with everyone else, to participate in the quickening pace of social development,” remarked an older so-called “que zi” named Zheng, “we had to devise something to help us move around, and to help us move around independently.” Transforming bicycles into hand-crank tricycles, and later buying disability motorcycles, became a way for many people like Zheng to keep up. Hand-crank tricycles allowed them to move around alone at speeds far faster than ever possible before.

But why, over the years, have so many male and so few female “que zi” adopted tricycle technology, be it hand-crank or motorized? Why is it that, at one of Beijing’s largest retailers of three-wheeled conveyances for the disabled, the staff in 1995 were unable to remember ever selling a vehicle either to or for a woman? Granted, reported cases of polio paralysis in
China have predominated among males, to the degree that in 1987 male survivors outnumbered females 3 to 2 (Ministry of Civil Affairs 1993). Yet such figures alone cannot explain the near absence of females among the ranks of tricycle owners in the mid 1990s. Thus, forces typically beyond the purview of most epidemiologists must be at play.

One of these forces, which has become closely tied to Fordism in modern China and elsewhere, is the evolving politics of gender. Gender is about many things. But something it is consistently about in almost every culture is the power to traverse and control space (Bourdieu 1990: 77–78). Today in China, nearly all men and women of working age are willing, if not eager, to venture away from home to earn a better living. The existence of more than 100 million “floating” migrants strongly evinces that Chinese society has come to increasingly define personal status, male and female alike, in terms of the ability (neng li) to project oneself out of the home and local community and into public arenas.

But the way men and women move across the Chinese topography differs in at least one important way. While both men and women increasingly use gas-powered instruments of time-space compression, the people who control and operate these machines – much like most bicycle operators of the 1950s and 1960s – are nearly all male. Whether it is tractors or trucks, motorcycles or cars, ships or trains, buses or airplanes, those piloting gas-powered conveyances today are predominantly men.

A number of authors, writing on cultures other than China, have discussed how sexual identity and gender inequality are refracted by the way people use technologies of time-space compression (Bolton 1979, Bourque & Warren 1987, Mosse 1985, Connell 1995, Scharff 1991). While cultural differences obviously exist, it would seem that, in contemporary China, such technologies have come to play an important role in distinguishing the so-called “idealized man” (nan zi han) from its “female” counterpart; and that, unlike womanhood in China, manhood is increasingly equated with controlling conveyances of speed in order to demonstrate and generate status.

This has been echoed frequently in discussions I have had with Chinese people from all walks of life over the last decade. So too has its female converse. Some of the most poignant comments on the latter have come paradoxically from a small number of female taxi drivers. When asked why it is so rare to see women at the wheel of motorized vehicles (ji dong che), female taxi operators have consistently said that driving is “unsuitable” to women because it challenges their socially prescribed role as “keeper of the home” and because venturing alone from the hearth is “more dangerous” for women than men.
That female “que zi” have adopted tricycle technology so infrequently is no doubt connected to this stereotypical gendering of public and private space. Less obvious, though, is how the male-female discrepancy in tricycle usage is closely related to intersubjective delegitimation. Living with a lower-body impairment is excruciating for Chinese – whoever they are. But the locus of pain seems to undergo significant gender differentiation. For men, the most difficult aspect seems to be immobility. For females, however, their pain appears to center around bodily imperfection. This juxtaposition is strongly supported by informant comments regarding tricycles. Many women have told me they would never drive a hand-crank or motorized tricycle because it would only draw attention to their appearance (wai mao). As a Ms. Cai says, “women like me who have trouble walking are less able to endure people’s looks and comments about our appearance when we go out in public. We’re much happier staying at home.” Many men who drive three wheelers, by contrast, articulate sentiments similar to that of a Mr. Lin: “Sure, the stares hurt. But, what hurt even more was, in the past, when I was young, being closed up in the house. I’m never going back to that kind of life . . . I’m not going to be a hermit because people look at me.”

CHANGING DEFINITIONS OF DISABILITY

The fusion of all of these forces – gender, Fordism and delegitimation – is also closely reflected in changing definitions of the term can ji (the term which is regularly translated today as “disability”). Documents indicate that, during China’s long existence, people tended to use the ideogram can to represent male bodily injury and disease. Today, while many Chinese citizens continue to use can ji in this gendered and physiological way, they additionally associate it closely with the idiom “que zi,” which as noted above has increasingly come to denote “the immobile.” The contemporary linkage between can ji and immobility came across strongly during my fieldwork. When requested to describe everybody can ji in their natal communities, the vast majority of respondents talked about “men” who they characterized as having a “lame foot” (que jiao), “unable to walk” (bu neng zao la de), or “immobile” (dong bu liao de). In other words, it would seem that the paradigmatic popular image of “the disabled person” has become the very sort of person that, in the 1970s, most often adopted three-wheeled hand-crank tricycles.
ENTER THE MOTORIZED TRICYCLE & THE FEDERATION

By the late 1980s, these paradigmatic disabled people found a new transportation device available to them. This was the machine I first observed outside the ping-pong stadium. Chinese citizens usually refer to such gasoline-powered tricycles as three wheelers, disability bikes, or motorized tricycles. For the informed PRC observer, the machines appear to be a cross between at least three pre-existing and predominantly male devices of time-space compression: the hand-held tractor, the police motorcycle with side-car, and the hand-crank tricycle.

From where have three wheelers emanated, and how has their proliferation related to the forces described above? These machines are the product of the Disabled Persons’ Federation. And, in order to outline their genesis, something more must be said about the term can ji and the Federation.

In the 1980s, the Chinese state began attempting to do two things to the term can ji: (1) broaden its meaning in relation to the transnational term “disability”\textsuperscript{13} and (2) give it society-wide significance as a welfare entity. As many readers will know, the person in China who has done the most to bring about these changes has been Deng Xiaoping’s eldest son, Deng Pufang. Less known, however, is the degree to which time-space compression has influenced not only Deng Pufang’s lifecourse but also how his institution, the Federation, has framed disability in the post-Mao period. As a youth, Deng Pufang took avid interest both in operating conveyances of speed and in utilizing high technology for national development. He regularly pedaled a bicycle to-and-from school – something which his biographer says made him “extremely cheerful” (kuai huo, literally meaning “fast with life”) – and he coaxed his father’s drivers to teach him how to operate a car (Qin 1992: 132, 123).

Pufang lost the ability to control either a bicycle or an auto at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, a period when Mao dictated that class purity, not developmental speed, was to be the nation’s key concern. In the spring of 1968, while under incarceration by Red Guards who demanded he denounce his father as a “capitalist roader,” Deng threw himself from an upper-story window of a building at Beijing University, where he was a graduate student in nuclear physics. After Deng Pufang experienced several years living isolated and immobilized in a dilapidated welfare facility on the outskirts of Beijing, Mao agreed to let him rejoin his family. Three years after Mao’s death, Pufang reinjured his unstable spine, probably as a consequence of propelling himself by wheelchair. His family (once again at the apex of the Chinese political system) used their special access to devices of time-space compression to fly Pufang to Canada for types of surgery unavailable anywhere in Asia. After his surgery, as Pufang
lay recuperating in Ottawa, he decided to cut short his treatment and to rush back to his homeland in order to become an advocate for China’s disabled (Qin 1992: 244).

On his return to Beijing, Deng’s initial project was to build a facility like the Ottawa Civic Hospital and have it serve as a flagship for the speedy development of rehabilitation medicine (kang fu yi liao). To raise funds and enlist high-ranking advocates for the center, Deng Pufang and a handful of other “crippled” men of elite personage established the Federations’ precursor, the China Disabled Persons’ Welfare Fund. The hospital was built during the mid 1980s. It is called the China Rehabilitation Research Center (CRRC) and is located in southwestern Beijing. Much to the Disabled Persons’ Federation’s chagrin, the CRRC has been as much a locus of controversy as a source of care since its opening. The Federation, however, has strongly supported the CRRC throughout the hospital’s rocky history and, today, promotes more large, technology-laden rehabilitation centers elsewhere in China. Two reasons the Federation has so ardently followed this path have been (a) the way Pufang initially embraced the western medical model for disability (i.e., that to aid disabled people one must heal them through clinic-based rehabilitation medicine) and (b) the way Pufang oriented his rehabilitation goals around his father’s national developmental agenda of using technology to speed up the Chinese economy. Regarding the latter, Pufang has regularly represented Federation work, and rehabilitation efforts in particular, as follows: that their mission is to employ scientific means to help the sort of people, who would otherwise fall behind, to keep up and contribute actively to the rapid changes his father has set in motion across China (e.g., Deng 1988).

There is another reason why the Federation has been so anchored to quick-fix technology and institution-based rehabilitation. After its founding in 1988, the Federation began a massive expansion program. In addition to its central Beijing offices, the Federation established chapters in every major city and provincial capital, and began working to create independent offices in all county seats and major metropolitan city districts. The Federation also applied to the State Council for full ministerial status. What was driving all this rapid expansion? Death. Deng Pufang and his staff were in possession of a moribund treasure: filial ties to China’s paramount leader. They consequently were racing to convert this treasure – this symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1984) – into a powerful and durable institution. The more symbolic capital they could convert to bureaucratic structures before Deng Xiaoping’s death, they calculated, the better chance the Federation would have at continuing its existence long into the future. Indeed, it could be argued that, for Deng and his staff, the regime of time-space
compression was simply a tool for accruing the more traditional, the more inertia-bound, the more typically Chinese form of power: bureaucracy.

Yet, to stimulate wide-scale support for bureaucracy building, Federation leaders needed more than ties to Deng Xiaoping. They needed to create tangible proof that they were improving the livelihood of people and they needed to publicize this proof. Rehabilitation medicine was at the heart of this public relations campaign. In its first few years of existence, the Federation used rehabilitation techniques to treat hundreds of thousands of people across the country and they orchestrated a steady flow of local and national media reports about individuals being transformed by the humanitarian efforts of the Federation.\textsuperscript{17}

THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THREE WHEELERS

How do motorized tricycles fit in here? The vehicles were the first “rehabilitation products” designed by the CRRC’s Rehabilitation Engineering Institute. That the Federation produced these devices and, through the mid 1990s, continued to guarantee their right to exist, not only related to the Federation’s institution-building agenda, but reaffirmed the cultural link between can ji and the idea of immobility.

Currently, motorized tricycles can be found in greatest concentration in China’s highly structured metropolitan transportation landscape. To anyone visiting China for the first time, urban traffic there might seem anything but structured. But despite the growing malady of vehicular gridlock, state control of urban roadway usage is often tight, which means getting around urban China by any method besides foot, human-powered cycle, or mass transportation remains very much a privilege and a mark of status.

The fact three wheelers have enjoyed such a privilege stems from their institutional and symbolic link to Deng Pufang. In the beginning, the Federation, vehicle manufacturers and users barely had to emphasize that connection in order to keep traffic authorities in major cities from restricting three wheelers. But this changed in the early 1990s when the numbers of three wheelers started to surge – such that, by 1995, Shanghai officially had over 12,000 of them and Beijing had more than 30,000 (Liberation Daily, 19 March 1995; Beijing Evening News, 21 February 1995).

One force behind the exponential growth in three wheelers was their unregulated status and speed, both of which made them extremely useful tools for entrepreneurs, be they disabled or otherwise.\textsuperscript{18} Another force was the increase in supply. At the retail level, Federation chapters were the primary purveyors of motorized tricycles. Initially, when supplies were

\textsuperscript{17} See, for example, the Federation’s efforts to promote the use of rehabilitation medicine in rural areas through the establishment of rehabilitation centers.

\textsuperscript{18} The growth in three wheelers also reflects broader trends in Chinese society, including changes in transportation patterns and the increasing demand for personal mobility.
limited, chapter staff created waiting lists and limited sales to only those people who they viewed as demonstrably disabled. But, as supply grew, Federation chapters began selling three wheelers to anyone who wanted them, in order to generate greater earnings. By the mid 1990s, selling motorized tricycles had become a big business for Federation chapters and a primary way many were augmenting their incomes.19

In 1994, a number of city governments – alarmed by the growth of three wheelers and their unbridled use of public space – banned them. The result was protest by men calling themselves can ji. These men first acted locally, demanding that their city governments lift the bans. When that failed, many brought their grievances to the eastern edge of the Forbidden City, to 44 Beichizi Road, the home of the Central Disabled Persons’ Federation. A senior Federation official, who recounted these events to me under condition of anonymity, said the most ardent of the regional protesters was a group of men from the northeastern industrial city of Shenyang. These people traveled to Beijing twice in 1994, requesting that Deng Pufang intervene. Deng responded by inviting Shenyang’s mayor and Liaoning province’s governor to 44 Beichizi for extensive meetings with himself and top Federation officials. But before the meetings had a chance to get very far, the Federation’s main office in Shanghai began reporting that similar protests were breaking out there.

Realizing he had a national problem on his hand, Deng took action. He contacted one of the men with greatest administrative authority over public space in China, the Minister of Public Security. Deng and the minister met several times during the spring and summer of 1995. Their meetings were paralleled by lengthy discussions between high officials from both the Ministry and the Federation. Ministry staff took the position that three wheelers needed to be banned because they were dangerous and disruptive to public order. Deng and his Federation cadres countered with a detailed set of arguments.

After only modest resistance, the Ministry of Public Security agreed in early 1995 to nearly all the Federation’s points and signed a detailed set of regulations. The staff at 44 Beichizi were jubilant. It is easy to understand why. Besides being an important revenue source to local chapters, the vermilion tricycles were quickly becoming the most visible icons of the Federation and its constituency – disabled people – to be found on a daily basis in urban China. Local government attempts at banishing three wheelers were direct challenges to both the Federation and its constituencies’ attempts to speed-up, to amass more power.

Assessing how the Federation-Public Security agreement will affect popular definitions of disability across the country is difficult. But, based
on my time in Beijing where similar regulations have been in place already for a few years, I believe the agreement will intensify the linkage between the term *can ji* and the concept of immobility. For one, it requires a major and very public bureaucratization of three wheelers. Now, to avoid fines, people must register as a legal owner-operator, and to do this they must cross a series of administrative barriers and subject themselves to intensive institutional scrutiny. Also, if Beijing is representative of the future, motorized tricycle drivers nationwide can expect police to more closely monitor their movements vis-à-vis disability status; that is to say, police are increasingly likely to stop tricycles and evaluate the credentials and bodily status of their operators.

For these reasons, I expect that an increasing number of people across the country will come to understand what kind of people constitute the disabled in the way that ever larger numbers of people came to do during my stay in Beijing. As one of many people told me shortly before I left: “Oh *can ji*? They’re the ones the police permit to drive three wheelers. You know, *que zi*. People who can’t walk.”

**THE EXPERIENCE OF AUTOMATIC TRICYCLE USE**

Now that I have described some of the history surrounding three wheelers, I will switch gears (so to speak) and discuss ways these vehicles are shaping the experiences of people who regularly use them. Because the goal of this section is understanding how motorized tricycles have been influencing China’s emergent disability construct, the discussion here will not cover all tricycle drivers, but only “legal” owner-operators, most of whom have been male polio survivors.

Given the moral, gender, political, economic and institutional forces at play, what is it like for such men to buy and use three-wheeled devices of *time-space compression*? Let me first elucidate this with excerpts from interviews conducted with two Beijing polio survivors. The first excerpt comes from a man named Mr. Peng, who today runs a CD store.

*Peng:* The old hand-crank tricycles were remarkable. They let disabled people like me have concrete contact with society, often for the first time. I got my first hand-crank tricycle in 1985 when I was 22. I started working at a factory a little less than a year afterwards. It was an utterly transformative event getting a tricycle. With it I was able to leave home and go out and see the multi-colored world. Before then, I rarely had contact with anyone. I was closed out.

I purchased my first disability motorcycle three years later. I was still at the factory then, so I was able to pay for most of the three wheeler by myself. The initial feeling of driving a hand-crank bike and driving a disability motorcycle was very different. My initial impression of my first motor bike was how much quicker it was than a bicycle. The second
impression was that, without any force, I could go incredibly far. At first, I was spooked by it being so much faster than a bicycle. I was scared to take it out on the big boulevards and drive quickly with all the cars. Coping with this fear took a long time. I didn’t dare drive more than 20 km an hour back then. Not like now. Now I’ll go 50.

Getting a three wheeler, at first, gave me a deep sense of satisfaction. I can’t drive a car, but I have the ability (neing li) to drive this sort of motorcycle. That gave me a real sense of power and vanity (xu rong xing). I think all men have this sort of vanity. That I could drive this kind of vehicle really boosted mine. My heightened feeling of vanity has pretty much disappeared, however. Now, after six years on the road, I just look at my three wheeler as a transportation tool. It’s something I can’t survive without. If I walk out the door, I must use it. I couldn’t live or run my business without it.

As I see it, there are clear pros and cons to motorized tricycles. My scope of activity is much greater. That’s one pro. I’ve driven as far as 150 km to a tourist spot in Hebei with a bunch of disabled friends. Another is that it has given me the ability to open my own business and start supporting my parents. A con is, physically, I’m nowhere as strong as when I used a hand-crank bike. Before, I was strong enough to crank myself 10 km in less than 25 minutes, about as fast as a bicycle. Now, I probably couldn’t crank 10 km an hour. Another con is the danger of accident. That’s why I wear a helmet. If I crash and become more disabled, I’m done for. As an independent businessman, I have no national health insurance, no nothing. If I have a serious accident, I’m dead.

The next man, Mr. Liu, is 39 years old. At age four, Liu contracted polio, which left his legs so weakened that, today, he cannot walk without leg braces and crutches. Mr. Liu rarely left his house before 1988, when, with the help of his parents and siblings with whom he lives, he purchased his first disability motorcycle. Five years ago, Mr. Liu opened a tobacco store. Mr. Liu makes a good living from this shop and contributes more to the family’s finances than his retired parents combined.

MK: Can you tell me about getting your first three wheeled motorcycle?

Liu: I purchased it from the factory, very near the Rehabilitation Research Center. The quality was dreadful. It’s funny. The first thing I did after buying that motorcycle, wasn’t learn how to drive it, but go out and purchase a manual and study automotive repair. [laugh] Everyday I had to fix something, the carburetor, the wheel bearings, the brakes. It was fun learning how to fix a motorcycle, but it was also a real pain in the ass. The big advantage was that, when I’d go out on the road and the bike broke down, I didn’t need others’ help. After so many years depending on people – my parents, my siblings – I just want to take care of myself. That motorcycle, as horrible as it was, allowed me to become much more self sufficient.

The second motorcycle, the one I’m still using, I got at the Disabled Persons’ Service Center [run by the city Federation]. It’s a Jia Ling. Jia Ling has become the most popular brand of motorcycle among disabled people because it has a Japanese-designed engine. I got my Jia Ling by pulling a nice little trick. It’s quite an interesting story. At first, the only place to get a Jia Ling was the Service Center and the boss there was a real bastard. He’d take your money for a new motorcycle, but he wouldn’t hand over the bike for months. So, when I’d saved up enough money, I spoke to one of the boss’ men. I told him, “Sir, I don’t have a motorcycle and I need one right away because the government has just moved the factory where I work to the suburbs.” The guy was skeptical. He thought I was going to
resell the vehicle for a big markup. So he had me write and sign a guarantee I wouldn’t do that. Afterwards, he said, “OK, you’re a disabled guy, you deserve to have a motorcycle.” Later that day I drove my Jia Ling home. [laugh]

But the truth is I really didn’t like lying to that guy. In general, I never lie. Well, almost never. Sometimes, if I’m giving a person a ride and the police stop me I’ll fool the cop by saying I’m on my way to do some business and my passenger is coming along to carry me up the stairs to the office I must reach. I think lying to a cop in that way is OK.

MK: Have you always been this bold?

Liu: [laugh] No. I was pretty childish before. I was just like an infant, always at home, always needing others to do things for me. Once I started to get out of the house, once I set up my own store, I became much more pushy. My parents frequently urge me to be more cautious, particularly when I drive. Going out on the Beijing streets on a three wheeler is very, very dangerous. But what choice do I have? To make a living, to help the family, I need to drive one of these bikes. Still, it’s hard not to think about the fact that an accident might leave me even more crippled (can fei).

Several points stand out from these excerpts. Mr. Peng’s and Mr. Liu’s access to devices of time-space compression has altered their lives enormously, and their transformations have been framed by a paradoxical mix of sensations. Buying tricycles and traveling alone at increasingly higher speeds has been, to a large degree, a joy for Peng and Liu. It has bolstered their sense of self-worth and given them the power — or ability (neng li) — to expand their experiential and economic reach. This joy, however, has been dampened by deep feelings of fear and dependence. Peng and Liu clearly state their lives and businesses are at once contingent on and threatened by their access to three wheelers. To sustain their current situation, they need the speed of motorized tricycles. Yet they and their families worry — and for good reason — such speed might either kill them or cause an injury that will worsen their disablement.22

LIVING A PARADOX

There are several ways men like Peng and Liu have been responding to the paradoxical mixture of feelings (pleasure, fear, dependence) entering their lives as a consequence of motorized tricycle usage. Before concluding, let me outline three.

One response has been to enter into active relationships with the Federation. These relationships have been closely akin to patron-client connections. As Walder (1986) has described, patron-client relations are a key feature of rulership in Communist China and are built around government agencies, like the Federation, exchanging privileges for client loyalty. The primary way tricycle drivers articulate such loyalty is by being public relations figures. As stated earlier, the Federation, even before its formal
founding, has required easily recognized and highly functional “disabled people” to participate in the public events it has regularly mounted over the last decade as it races for ministerial rank. More often than not, these “disabled people” have tended to be men, similar to the ones enlisted by Beijing’s city Federation to work as FESPIC Games cheerleaders.23 For people such as Liu and Peng, working intimately with Federation offices has been a way to guarantee that the joys entering their lives as a result of three wheelers will not be eroded but instead enhanced. Many drivers like Liu and Peng give time and deference to the Federation and its staff in exchange for informal assistance with a host of things like dismissal of traffic fines, career advancements, housing assignments, residence permit transfers, enrollment of children in choice schools, and tax reductions.

A second way men, particularly those in Beijing, have responded to the paradoxical feelings associated with three wheeler usage has been by developing identities more strongly connected to the category of disability (can ji). To a certain degree, this connection is the result of contact with the Federation. But more importantly it stems from interactions with other so-called “que zi” (interactions which have been made increasingly possible by motorized tricycles). Through these interactions, drivers have developed tightly knitted circles (quan zi) of what, in Beijing, they call “disability brothers” (can ji ge mer). At the heart of such circles is the idea of mutual assistance. Disability brothers treat one another to meals at restaurants and homes. They exchange professional services. They act as matchmakers. Disability brothers go on trips together. They pool finances when one falls on hard times. They share instrumental contacts. And disability brothers provide emotional support when trouble strikes. The intensity and importance of these circles is strongly reflected in a statement uttered by a man while he and I shared a home-cooked meal with a bunch of his brothers and some of their wives: “The only people I really trust, the only people with whom I’m willing to express my honest feelings are my disability brothers. When I’m away from them, when I’m with others, say my parents, people at work, I’m a fake.”

A third way survivors have responded to three wheeler usage has been collective action. Obvious examples are the protests that popped up across the country when city governments tried to ban motorized tricycles. Collective action, however, has extended beyond petitioning Federation officials for protection from top-down modes of state-sponsored delegitimation. Disability brothers have also joined together to criticize the Federation, itself, and to challenge non-governmental sectors of society. For instance, in late 1994, a group of disability brothers in Beijing sent a letter to the mayor in which they accused the city Federation’s
by the aggressive attitudes of people like Peng and Liu. But, until more systemic efforts are made – either to (i) change people's attitudes that mobility and ability are coterminous, or (ii) make the built world within China more accessible for all people who have difficulty walking – the discrimination will no doubt continue.

We must recognize also that men like Peng and Liu constitute only a small fraction of the millions of people in urban, let alone rural, China who fall within the Federation's overall criteria of "disability." In recent years, the lives of the less-visible majority – including the blind, the deaf, the mentally ill, the mentally disabled – have not been experiencing re-legitimation or even quasi-legitimation anywhere to the degree as disability brothers. Evolving cultural prescriptions like those blocking females from using motorcycles, compounded by the Federation's institution-driven emphasis on quick-fix rehabilitation are causing significant disparities in how people under the Federation aegis are served.

To that extent, it could be argued that contemporary China is fostering a class system within its emergent disability sphere. For those people living in urban China today whose bodies fall within certain government-drawn parameters (i.e., having only a specific kind of lower body impairment), there exists the possibility for some social advancement via motorcycle-assisted entrepreneurship. For those whose bodies do not fall within the parameters, however, such advancement is far more illusory.

Unless radical changes occur within the Federation and Chinese society, it seems that this sort of class disparity will continue to grow. Some observers, no doubt, might think that the mounting force of disability brothers will invariably lead men like Mr. Peng and Mr. Liu to become disability "activists" similar to the wheelchair-bound men who directed the disability rights movement in the United States between 1970 and 1990 (Shapiro 1993). Unfortunately, this seems unlikely. Disability brothers' interests are largely provincial, primarily focused on dealing among themselves with the paradoxes attendant to driving three wheelers. And other than the disability brothers, there are few networks of people in China today who identify strongly enough with the concept of disability that they might try to significantly change the current course.

NOTES
2. Antonio Gramsci stated that Fordism has entailed "the biggest collective effort to date to create, with unprecedented speed ... a new type of worker and a new type of man"
by the aggressive attitudes of people like Peng and Liu. But, until more systemic efforts are made – either to (i) change people’s attitudes that mobility and ability are coterminous, or (ii) make the built world within China more accessible for all people who have difficulty walking – the discrimination will no doubt continue.

We must recognize also that men like Peng and Liu constitute only a small fraction of the millions of people in urban, let alone rural, China who fall within the Federation’s overall criteria of “disability.” In recent years, the lives of the less-visible majority – including the blind, the deaf, the mentally ill, the mentally disabled – have not been experiencing re-legitimation or even quasi-legitimation anywhere to the degree as disability brothers. Evolving cultural prescriptions like those blocking females from using motorcycles, compounded by the Federation’s institution-driven emphasis on quick-fix rehabilitation are causing significant disparities in how people under the Federation aegis are served.

To that extent, it could be argued that contemporary China is fostering a class system within its emergent disability sphere. For those people living in urban China today whose bodies fall within certain government-drawn parameters (i.e., having only a specific kind of lower body impairment), there exists the possibility for some social advancement via motorcycle-assisted entrepreneurship. For those whose bodies do not fall within the parameters, however, such advancement is far more illusory.

Unless radical changes occur within the Federation and Chinese society, it seems that this sort of class disparity will continue to grow. Some observers, no doubt, might think that the mounting force of disability brothers will invariably lead men like Mr. Peng and Mr. Liu to become disability “activists” similar to the wheelchair-bound men who directed the disability rights movement in the United States between 1970 and 1990 (Shapiro 1993). Unfortunately, this seems unlikely. Disability brothers’ interests are largely provincial, primarily focused on dealing among themselves with the paradoxes attendant to driving three wheelers. And other than the disability brothers, there are few networks of people in China today who identify strongly enough with the concept of disability that they might try to significantly change the current course.

NOTES


2. Antonio Gramsci stated that Fordism has entailed “the biggest collective effort to date to create, with unprecedented speed … a new type of worker and a new type of man”
with a new mode of work “inseparable from . . . living and thinking and feeling life” (quoted both in Martin 1992: 122 and Harvey 1990: 126).

3. In 500 BC, after all, Sun Tzu declared, “Speed is the essence of battle.”

4. Before the 20th century, wheelchairs in China were extremely rare and usually home-built. Four-wheeled wheelchairs of western design were uncommon in China until recently and were generally found only in hospitals. Most of these were imports and thus costly, and they also had the problem of being too large for many Chinese homes.

5. See Brownell (1995: 16) for a discussion of the terms shen ti and shen fen.

6. The most frequently noted source for how Chinese society has historically emphasized bodily perfection is Confucianism. Key here is an oft-cited passage of the Book of Filial Piety where Confucius is described as stating that all children have the filial duty to preserve the body given them by their parents and that they must avoid even their hair or skin being injured.

7. Given the pejorative meanings attached to the term que zi and the pain its usage regularly inflicts on many Chinese, I am reluctant to invoke it. On the other hand, one of anthropology’s central goals is to examine culture’s culpability in the production of suffering—and this can only be done by direct observation. I am further inclined to use the term que zi rather than depend on euphemistic terms like “disabled” or “handicapped” because, as the American polio survivor and author Leonard Kriegel notes, these terms do “little more than further society’s illusions about illness and accident . . . For to be “disabled” or “handicapped” is to deny . . . the rage, anger, and pride of having managed to survive as a crippled (1991: 61).” Lastly, I am inclined to use the category que zi here because many of my informants, who community members recognize by the term, regularly invoke que zi when speaking. Therefore, my solution, however imperfect, is to follow literary convention and place “que zi” in quotations. By doing so, I hope readers will be alerted continually to the power and pain attendant to the word.


10. Until the creation of the Disabled Persons' Welfare Fund in the early 1980s, can ji was not used much in institutional or popular discourse. Still, like its two main Chinese language cognates—can fei and fei ji—can ji dates back deep into antiquity. Contemporary dictionaries define the ideograms that make up these three couplets as follows: can, a verb, meaning to injure, to spoil, to destroy, to oppress; a noun, denoting remnant or residue; fei, a verb, meaning to do away with, to abrogate, to waste, to destroy; an adjective denoting useless, wasted, or abandoned; and ji, a noun, meaning sickness, disease, or pain. Because of the particularly pejorative meanings associated with the ideogram fei, China's party-state stopped using the terms can fei and fei ji in the mid-1980s and pressed for can ji to be used in their place.

11. One example of how, in the past, the ideogram can was linked to men comes from China's imperial censuses. Starting as early as the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–A.D.220), Chinese sovereigns required local magistrates to count men under their control (Rockhill 1904: 659). Men counted by censuses were recorded under the title ding. Starting in 1391, imperial documents directed local magistrates to stop counting as ding the following males: "can ji," "the aged," "children under ten," "widowers" and "migrants." (Zhao n.d.: 4.2a–2b; also cited in Ho 1999: 11). A more recent example of linkages between can and males comes from the military arena. In 1950, the
Chinese government established a graded criteria for identifying and compensating “revolutionary crippled veterans” (ge ming can fei jun ren).

12. According to Wieger (1965), the earliest meanings associated with the radicals that comprise the ideogram can were “destruction,” “broken bones,” and “male skeletal remains.” Matthew’s Chinese-English Dictionary (1931) states that the English equivalents for can ji and can fei are maimed, crippled, or deformed. The Large Chinese Dictionary (han ya da ci dian) (1989) offers similar definitions but adds that can ji may also denote ailment or disease.

13. The Chinese government today recognizes five categories of disabled people: physically disabled, mentally ill, mentally disabled, blind, and deaf. These five categories and their corresponding criteria were created and codified by the Chinese government, initially, for the 1987 National Sample Survey of Disabled Persons.

14. I employ the word “crippled” here because it is the term used by Deng Pufang’s official biographer, Qin Yan (1992), to describe Pufang and his colleagues during this period.

15. One conflict has been over the CRRC and Deng’s umbrella organization controlling and dictating the development of rehabilitation medicine in China. Primarily a battle over resources, the conflict has involved the Ministry of Public Health doing such things as denying insurance coverage (gong fei yi liao) for many kinds of rehabilitation treatment, sponsoring competing rehabilitation centers and projects, and challenging the Federation’s right to co-author documents with institutions of ministerial rank (bu ji) or higher. Another systemic issue centers on whether the Federation could better spend its resources developing more community-based rehabilitation programs—rather than capital-intensive, technology-laden facilities like the CRRC (cf. Henderson 1989, World Bank 1992).

16. In explaining their sense of urgency to me, Central Federation officials repeatedly invoked a Chinese aphorism, shi zai ren wei, which can be translated as “tasks can only be accomplished when you have the right person on your side.”

17. High ranking Federation officials have told me that the kinds of treatments they usually provided—cataract surgery, polio-correction surgery, and oral language training for deaf children—were chosen (a) because the Federation leadership saw these treatments as the quickest and the most effective procedures for aiding three out of the five Federation-recognized categories of disability and (b) because the procedures were viewed to be public-relations-friendly ways for the Federation to assist the disabled and garner more resources. Federation leaders chose the two surgical procedures, in particular, because China’s military had a ready supply of surgeons familiar with the procedures and because the military was willing to deploy those surgeons at almost no cost owing to Deng Xiaoping’s longtime ties with China’s military leadership.

18. It is now common for motorized tricycle drivers to earn sizable incomes moving consumer goods and transporting people. This has been particularly common in cities where standard motorcycles are banned.

19. Like nearly all state agencies throughout China, Federation chapters receive most of their funding from local city, county and district governments; and the chapters are expected to bolster their budgets by pursuing entrepreneurial activities. Prices in Beijing for the most popular type of three-wheelers, produced by the motorcycle manufacturer Jia Ling, hovered around 3,500 yuan in 1995.

20. In Beijing, where city-level regulations began to appear as early 1989, the barriers include: (1) getting registered as a disabled person, (2) buying a vehicle, (3) getting the vehicle and oneself licensed, (4) registering for commercial status. Each of these steps have numerous sub-steps, many of which require owner-operators visit-
ing hospitals and government offices to have their bodies measured along a host of axes (e.g., national identity, residential status, age, psychological competency, physical functionality, impairment level).

21. In March of 1995, for example, I witnessed Beijing’s Fourteenth Automatic Tricycle Rectification Campaign. One hundred police teams spread out across the city stopping three wheelers either lacking a license plate or operated by anyone the police suspected was an illegal driver. A similar campaign in 1994 resulted in police fining 16,330 riders and impounding nearly 6,000 bikes (Beijing Evening News, 21 February 1995). Oddly though, campaigns like this have done little to stem the number of illegally operated three wheelers. The main reason is the cost-benefit issue. The fines given during the campaigns are paltry when compared to the potential earnings for using bikes illegally. According to several Beijing government acquaintances, that fines are kept low in the capital is because of the tremendous influence the Federation wields there.

22. Whether in Beijing or elsewhere, most three wheeler accidents likely go unreported to traffic authorities because so many of the devices are illegally operated. Nonetheless, according to the police, there were 40 motorized tricycle accidents in Beijing during 1994, resulting in 31 injuries and seven deaths (Beijing Evening News, 21 February 1995).

23. Another example of this comes from my eastern Hainan field site. Between 1989 and 1995, more than ninety percent of “disabled advisory members” attached to the Wenchang county Federation office were male and nearly all of them were polio survivors.

REFERENCES

Appadurai, A.

Bolton, R.

Bourdieu, P.

Bourque, S. and K. B. Warren

Bray, F.

Brownell, S.

De Certeau, M.

Connell, R. W.
Deng, P.

Gaubatz, P. R.

Gramsci, A.

Hansson, H.

Harvey, D.

Henderson, G.

Ho, P.T.

Kleinman, A., et al.

Kohrmann, M.

Kriegel, L.

Lu, D. and S. Dao

Mark, R.

Martin, E.

Ministry of Civil Affairs

Mosse, G.
Ong, A. and D. Nonini

Qin, Y.
1992 The Deng Pufang Road (deng pu fang de lu). Hong Kong: Kai Yi Press.

Rockhill, W.W.

Shapiro, J.

Scharff, V.

Strathern, M.

Walder, A.

Wiegner, L.

World Bank

World Health Organization

Zhao, G., ed.

*Department of Anthropology, Harvard University*